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DIBELARDINO v. LEMMON PHARMACAL CO.:
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION FOR
BREACH OF WARRANTY
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in DiBelardino v. Lemmon
Pharmacal Co.' recently held that the Pennsylvania wrongful
death statute2 authorized only a right of action in tort. Hence, an
action in assumpsit for breach of warranty could not be brought
under the statute.
This Note will examine the law of wrongful death in various
jurisdictions and its relation to warranty, giving particular em-
phasis to the status of the law in Pennsylvania regarding death ac-
tions in warranty.
Plaintiff, in her dual capacity as widow and administratrix of
her husband's estate, instituted an action in assumpsit against the
drug company which sold to decedent's doctor the drug injected into
the decedent's body just before his death. The complaint contained
two counts. The first count was based upon the wrongful death
statutes and the second upon the survival statute.4 The complaint
made no averment of negligence or unlawful violence, but rather
relied upon a breach of implied warranty theory. The defendant
filed preliminary objections which raised three issues: (a) that an
action in assumpsit did not lie under the wrongful death statute,
(b) that an action in assumpsit did not lie under the survival stat-
ute, and (c) that no cause of action had been pleaded since there
was no averment of any privity of contract between the decedent
and the drug company. The lower court sustained the first pre-
liminary objection and dismissed the other two objections. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that an action in assumpsit for
breach of warranty cannot be maintained under the present wrong-
ful death statute of Pennsylvania.
DEATH ACTIONS AND WARRANTY
At common law death actions were unknown.5 Moreover, the
death of either the plaintiff or defendant terminated all causes of
action for personal torts. Contract actions, on the other hand, sur-
vived the death of either party.
6
1. 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d 283 (1965).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601, 1602 (1953).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950).
5. Whatever possibility there was that such an action might be main-
tained was eliminated in 1808 by Lord Ellenborough, who held that "in
civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury." Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
6. PROSSER, TORTS 920 (3d ed. 1964).
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Legislation was enacted in England in 1833 to provide for the
survival to a decedent's estate of actions he had at the time of his
death.7 In 1846 the Fatal Accidents Acts was enacted in England.
This act, generally known as Lord Campbell's Act, has been the
prototype for wrongful death acts in the United States. It created
a new right of action on behalf of designated beneficiaries to com-
pensate them for the pecuniary loss suffered by reason of the death
of the decedent. The act permitted an action for wrongful death
arising out of "a wrongful act, neglect, or default." Since contract
actions survived to the decedent's personal representative while
tort actions did not, it seems logical that the wrongful death stat-
utes were intended to refer only to tort actions.9 Most courts
agree that death statutes do not apply when the death results from
a pure breach of contract. 10
It is also settled that a contractual relationship between the
decedent and the defendant does not prevent the action from
sounding in tort." Even though a contractual relationship existed
between the decedent and the defendant, the mere fact that the
complaint contains such allegations will not defeat the right of ac-
tion under the death statutes. This may result because the contract
imposes a duty which when breached results in a tort, such as the
duty of a doctor to his patient. Under this interpretation, allega-
tions respecting the contract are regarded as a preliminary state-
ment showing how the defendant's obligation or duty arose.1 2 This
is the position taken by the Pennsylvania courts.18 Other courts
hold that it is immaterial whether the cause of action sounds in
contract or in tort. They conclude that it is unnecessary to deter-
mine this question when the statute creates a new cause of action
for wrongful death, since it is sufficient if such wrongful death ap-
pears from the particular allegations.1
4
7. Civil Procedure Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.
8. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93. Section 1 of this act provided that:
[W]hensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then,
and in every such case, the person who would have been liable
if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the party injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as to
amount in law to a felony.
9. PROSSER, TORTS 925 (3d ed. 1964).
10. See Willey v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 9 F.2d 937 (N.D. Cal. 1925),
aff'd, 18 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1927); Revel v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co., 238
Ill. App. 4 (1925), aff'd sub nom., Revel v. Butler, 322 Ill. 337, 153 N.E. 682
(1926); Barley's Adm'x v. Clover Splint Coal Co., 286 Ky. 218, 150 S.W.2d
670 (1941); Bloss v. Dr. C.R. Woodson Sanitarium Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.
2d 367 (1928).
11. Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
12. Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1931).
13. Hoehle v. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. Super. 21 (1897).
14. Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hosp., 96 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y. Supp.
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Although most courts will deny recovery for wrongful death
when the plaintiff sues on the theory of contract alone, it does not
necessarily follow that recovery should be denied when the theory
of the action is breach of warranty, particularly implied warranty.15
Most courts, however, have failed or refused to recognize that war-
ranty basically sounds in tort or at least has a dual character of
tort and contract. They have held that wrongful death actions
cannot be based upon breach of warranty. These courts reason
that since there was no common law right of action for the death of
another, any right to maintain such an action must be based on
statute. The gist of a warranty action has become contractual. A
warranty action, therefore, is not included within the wrongful
death statutes6 since these statutes were intended to apply to
torts only.
17
Perhaps the leading case to the contrary is Greco v. S.S.
Kresge Co.' s This was a wrongful death action based on a breach
of implied warranty of fitness of food for human consumption.
Plaintiff specifically disclaimed negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. The New York death statute permitted "an action to re-
cover damages for a wrongful act, neglect, or default, by which the
decedent's death was caused."' 9  The Greco court liberally inter-
401 (Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd without opinion, 176 App. Div. 885, 161 N.Y. Supp.
1143 (1916). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R. 880 (1932).
15. Although the distinction between express and implied war-
ranty should not be material in determining whether a death
action can be maintained in warranty, it can be noted that an
express warranty is more in the realm of actual contract than is
implied warranty.
2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 653 n. 5 (1964).
16. PROSSER, TORTS 652 n. 95 (3d ed. 1964).
17. Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935). Other
cases in which wrongful death statutes have been construed as limiting the
right of action to an ex delicto action include Sterling Aluminum Prod. Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1944) (Missouri law), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 761 (1944); S. H. Kress Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331 (5th Cir.
1919) (Mississippi law); Sugai v. General Motors Corp., 130 F. Supp. 101
(D. Idaho 1955); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385
(1932); Whiteley v. Webb's City Inc., 55 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1951); Barley's
Adm'x v. Clover Splint Coal Co., 286 Ky. 218, 150 S.W.2d 670 (1941); Dice's
Adm'r v. Zweigart's Adm'r, 161 Ky. 646, 171 S.W. 195 (1914); Goodwin v.
Misticos, 207 Miss. 361, 42 So.2d 397 (1949); Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook,
196 Miss. 452, 17 So.2d 791 (1944); Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Woodson Sanitarium
Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d 367 (1928); Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N.H. 365,
189 Atl. 865 (1937); Goelz v. J. K. & Suzie L. Wadley Research Institute &
Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
18. 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938). Other jurisdictions have per-
mitted an action for wrongful death in warranty: B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) (Kansas law); Ewing v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) (Indiana law); Hinton v.
Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) (California law);
Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919); Parks v.
G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Schuler v. Union News
Co., 295 Mass. 350, 4 N.E.2d 465 (1936).
19. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAw § 130.
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preted the wrongful death statute holding that:
Violation of a duty owing to another is a wrongful act;
breach of a contract involving violation of a duty may like-
wise be a wrongful act. . . . Though the action may be
brought solely for the breach of implied warranty, the
breach is a wrongful act, a default, and, in its essential na-
ture, a tort. . . . The purchaser could recover, if living, be-
cause of the injury she received through the 'wrongful act'
or 'default' of the seller based on the breach of the implied
warranty that the food was fit for human consumption ...
Under the common law, a person injured through a breach
of duty imposed upon another, might, in his or her lifetime,
recover for such injury, but death put an end to liability of
the person responsible for such breach. The statute was
enacted to remedy partially that evil, not to perpetuate it
by leaving the statute open to narrow construction.
20
In wrongful death cases the American courts generally proceed
on the theory that there can be no recovery apart from statute.
2 1
The English courts, on the other hand, have held to the contrary.
In Jackson v. Watson & Sons,22 a husband-purchaser recovered from
the seller for his damages resulting from the injury and death of
his wife caused by her having eaten unwholesome food. The court
held that when a cause of action exists independent of the wrong
causing death, such as a breach of contract, the death is not an
essential part of the cause of action but is only an element in as-
certaining the damages.
23
The wrongful death statute in Pennsylvania, which is not typi-
cal of American death statutes, provides:
Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or
negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party
injured during his or her life, the widow of any such de-
ceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives
may maintain an action for and recover damages for the
death thus occasioned.
24
20. 277 N.Y. at 34-35.
21. On the subject of death actions in warranty see 2 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 42 (1964); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§
24.3, 28.21 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS §§ 95, 121 (3d ed. 1964); Note, 38 VA. L.
REV. 674 (1952); Comment, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 344 (1952); Note, 3 U. PITT. L.
REV. 362 (1937). See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 316 (1962); Annot., 115
A.L.R. 1026 (1938).
22. [1909] 2 K.B. 193.
23. See 23 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND § 976 (2d ed. 1936) wherein
it is stated:
An action may also be maintained apart from statutory provisions,
where there is a cause of action independently [sic] of the wrong
causing the death, such as a breach of contract, and damage arising
from the death may be included as an element of the damage.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953). Compare the statutory
language in the Pennsylvania death act with that utilized in the English




The DiBelardino court held that the language of this statute
restricts the right of action therein provided to an action in tort
and that an action in assumpsit is inappropriate.
25
The New York statute is broader than the Pennsylvania stat-
ute and leaves more room for interpretation. The Greco court con-
strued the New York statute as allowing a wrongful death action
for breach of warranty. New York is one of twenty-seven states26
which utilized the "wrongful act, neglect, or default" language of
the original English death statute in enacting its wrongful death
act. In Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp.27 the Illinois
Supreme Court construed its similarly worded statute as encom-
passing a breach of a physician's contract resulting in the patient's
death. The New Jersey statute is also modeled after the English
act. In Skovgaard v. The Vessel M/V The Tungus 28 a federal dis-
trict court held that under that statute "conduct required to impose
liability . . . is not limited to that conduct embraced in the his-
torical concept of negligence.
'29
The Florida court, on the other hand, in a case subsequent to
the Greco case, narrowly construed a statute almost identical to the
New York statute as not including an action based on a breach of
implied warranty. 0 The Florida legislature, in apparent displeas-
ure with this decision, subsequently amended the death statute to
provide that the right of action "shall extend to and include actions
ex contractu and ex delicto." 31
Sixteen states permit an action for death caused by "wrongful
act or neglect" or "wrongful act or omission" or have similarly
phrased statutes.32  Such statutes have been interpreted to in-
25. See 11 STANDARD PA. PRACTICE §§ 11 & 12 (1964).
26. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-611 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-906
(1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-2 (1963); FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1961);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 246-2 (1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1963); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2551 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 2 (1957);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (1948); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1949); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:31-1 (1952); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-20-1 (1953); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 130; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173
(1950); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01
(1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 10-7-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951
(1962); S.D. CODE § 37.2201 (Supp. 1960); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4761 (1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633
(1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5474 (1961);
WIS. STAT. § 331.03 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1065 (1957).
27. 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961).
28. 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957).
29. Id. at 17.
30. Whiteley v. Webb's City Inc., 55 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1951).
31. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1961).
32. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.340 (1964);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-311 (1948); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-404 (1946); IOWA CODE § 613.15 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1901 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.130 (1963); MINN. STAT. § 573.02
(1961); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1453 (1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2810
(1964); NEv. REV. STAT. § 12.090 (1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (1961);
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clude a wrongful death action in warranty.38 Mississippi, whose
death statute allows recovery for death caused by "wrongful or
negligent act or omission," spells out the warranty theory by estab-
lishing an action when death is caused "by the breach of any war-
ranty, express or implied, of the purity or fitness of any foods,
drugs, medicines, beverages, tobacco, or any and all other articles or
commodities intended for human consumption. .... ,,34
Pennsylvania and Delaware are the only states whose death
statutes restrict the action to a death caused by "unlawful violence
or negligence. '3 5  The highest court of Delaware has yet to con-
sider the issue which Pennsylvania decided in DiBelardino.
The remaining five states display diverse approaches to the
wording of their death statutes. Under the original Connecticut
statute, providing recovery when death was caused by "negligence
of the defendant or by his willful, malicious or felonious act,"
death was held not an allowable element of damages in an action
for breach of implied warranty of fitness of food for human con-
sumption.88 The statute was subsequently amended, however, to
permit recovery for death "from the party legally at fault."
37
Georgia permits recovery for homicide of husband or parent
and defines "homicide" as including "all cases where the death of a
human being results from a crime or from criminal or other neg-
ligence.138 Louisiana provides that a person shall be responsible for
"every act .. .that causes damage to another."89  The Massachu-
setts statute allows recovery for death caused by "negligence. . . or
by. . . willful, wanton or reckless act."
'40
The death statute in New Hampshire is singular. It provides
for an "action of tort for physical injuries."' 41 In Howson v. Foster
Beef Co.4 2 the court held that the statute did not permit a death
action based on a breach of implied warranty theory. The court
noted that warranty in New Hampshire was regarded as a contract,
and, since the statute was limited to tort actions, the provisions of
the statute were not available to the plaintiff. It would appear that
the Howson court failed to recognize the dual nature of warranty
when it held that it was purely contractual. It should be noted
that the law imposes an implied warranty that a product is of
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1955); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-11-7 (1953).
33. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959);
Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
34. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1453 (1956).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
3704(b) (1953).
36. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (1958).
38. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-1301-02 (1956).
39. LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1952).
40. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1965).
41. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:9 (1955).
42. 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935).
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merchantable quality43 or fit for the purpose for which it is sold.44
Since tort liability arises from a breach of a 'duty imposed by law,
as opposed to contract liability which is based on an agreement
between the contracting parties, the tort nature of implied warranty
becomes apparent. The Howson case was decided thirty years ago.
Should the question arise today, there is room within the wording
of the statute for a more liberal construction.
Although the New Hampshire statute restricts the action to an
action in tort, at least the court is free to construe a breach of im-
plied warranty as a tort and allow the maintenance of the action
should it choose to do so. The Pennsylvania statute, on the other
hand, leaves no room for such an interpretation. This statute per-
mits the action only when the death is caused by "unlawful vio-
lence or negligence." A death caused by a breach of warranty does
not fit within the scope of the statute. It would appear that due to
the peculiar wording of the wrongful death statute, the DiBelar-
dino court had no choice but to sustain defendant's objection that an
action in assumpsit did not lie under the wrongful death statute.
The DiBelardino dissent stated that the majority took an "un-
duly restricted view" of the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute.
Relying on Greco, it said that "unlawful violence or negligence"
could be interpreted as encompassing a death caused by an unsafe
drug. The New York statute, however, is so different from Penn-
sylvania's that any analogy would be untenable, except perhaps that
such construction should be afforded the statute, if possible. The
dissent also pointed out that since the statute is remedial in nature
it should be liberally construed. This should not mean, ac-
cording to the majority, that the court is free to allow under the
statute actions which the statute plainly does not contemplate:
We are fully aware that the 1851 statute . . . is remedial in
nature and thus subject to a liberal construction. How-
ever, that does not mean that we must, by construction,
extend such statute to include a right of action so obviously
not within the legislative intent as revealed by the statu-
tory language. The cause of action under the statute rests
upon "unlawful violence or negligence"; by the employment
of such terms, the legislature intended the right of action
under the statute to be redressed in a tort and not in an
assumpsit action.
45
The dissent said that the court should grant the statute a meaning
which would implement its intended effect. The legislative intent,
however, seems to be to restrict the action to one of tort, and not
just any tort but specifically "unlawful violence or negligence."
This is so because the legislature, in enacting the statute, chose to
depart from the language of the English act which was utilized by
so many of the other states.
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
44. UNIFOm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
45. 416 Pa. at 585.
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In Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co. 46 the Court noted that
death statutes were the result of dissatisfaction with archaisms of
the law. Hence, it would be unfortunate "if a narrow or grudging
process of construction were to . . perpetuate the very evils to be
remedied."
47
The DiBelardino case presented a narrow question of statu-
tory construction: "Is a death caused by a breach of warranty one
which may fairly be said to have been caused by unlawful violence
or negligence?" 48 The complaint made no averment of either negli-
gence or unlawful violence on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff
had to choose between two distinct types of actions: trespass based
upon Lemmon's negligence, if any, or assumpsit for breach of war-
ranty, which gives rise to strict liability and does not depend upon
any negligence or knowledge of defects on the part of the seller.
Plaintiff rested her case on the warranty theory. The Pennsyl-
vania wrongful death statute does not contain the "wrongful act,
neglect, or default" language utilized by the original English statute.
It merely creates a cause of action in favor of survivors of dece-
dents whose deaths were occasioned by "unlawful violence or negli-
gence." These words suggest liability based on fault. They are not
descriptive of liability without fault, upon which actions for breach
of warranty are based. It seems apparent that wrongful death ac-
tions in Pennsylvania are limited to actions in trespass. Had the
legislature provided in the statute for a cause of action based upon a
death occasioned by a default, the DiBelardino court could have
construed it to include a non-negligent breach of contract and
therefore could properly have held that plaintiff's action was avail-
able in assumpsit. This was the approach utilized in Greco.
It is interesting to note the anomaly which results from a rule
which states that in a wrongful death action in trespass, recovery
must be denied unless unlawful violence or negligence can be
proved. Assuming the drug had been negligently adulterated by
Lemmon, the action would have been available independent of the
breach of warranty and not because of it. The act requires negli-
gence and this would have been present. The fact that the negli-




The result of the DiBelardino decision is that a wrongful
death action cannot be brought on a breach of warranty theory in
Pennsylvania. The court's interpretation of the wrongful death
statute lays to rest the uncertainty resulting from opposing lower
46. 300 U.S. 342 (1937).
47. Id. at 350-51.
48. Brief for Appellee, Wilson & Co., p. 5, DiBelardino v. Lemmon
Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d 283 (1965).
49. Id. at 13. See Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa.,52, 95 At1. 931 (1915).
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court decisions.5 0 The case illustrates, however, the defect in the
wrongful death statute of Pennsylvania. It is not reasonable to
create a cause of action for the survivors of those decedents whose
deaths were occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence and not
to establish a remedy for the survivors of decedents whose deaths
were the result of a breach of warranty. The loss is just as great
regardless of the cause of the death.
Any broadening of the rights of these survivors may be done
only by the legislature. Pennsylvania is one of a minority of states
whose death statutes will not permit recovery in a death action in
warranty. There are presently two bills before the legislature
which would eliminate the inequity of the present law.51 These
bills, which are virtually identical, would amend the Act of May 13,
192752 to permit recovery of damages in actions for death caused
by a breach of an express or implied warranty. Such an amend-
ment would allow survivors of decedents whose deaths were caused
by a breach of warranty the same right to recovery available to
survivors of decedents whose deaths were caused by "unlawful
violence or negligence." This legislation should be enacted without
delay in order that recovery need not again be denied in any future
cases of this nature.
EDWARD P. NAJARIAN
50. Berkbile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 35 D. & C.2d 124 (C.P. No.
4 Phila. Co. 1964); Simone v. John J. Felin & Co. (No. 2), 35 D. & C. 687
(C.P. No. 6 Phila. Co. 1939). See also Barnard v. Pennsylvania Range
Boiler Co., 32 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Sacks v. Creasy, 211 F. Supp. 859
(E.D. Pa. 1962); Frankel v. Styer, 201 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
51. H.B. 547, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1965; H.B.
1271, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Session of 1965.
52. PA, STAT, AxN. tit. 12, § 1604 (1953).
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